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Wells Fargo & Co. and Subsidiaries v. Commissioner: 
Rethinking the Deductibility of Certain Pre-Merger 
Expenditures* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
According to the Mergers and Acquisitions Journal, mergers and ac-
quisitions activity has been smashing records over the past few years. 1 In 
fact, in 1998, for the first time in American history, over 10,000 transac-
tions were completed? A record breaking $1.394 trillion in transactions 
was completed in 1999.3 This trend has continued. In the first two quar-
ters of 2000 alone there were nearly $1 trillion in deals.4 Mega-mergers 
such as Chevron/Texaco, Time Wamer/AOL, and J.P. Morgan/Chase 
Manhattan are announced on what seems to be a regular basis. Indeed, 
there has been continual growth in the mergers and acquisitions arena. 
In each transaction, significant pre-merger costs are incurred.5 Such 
costs may include due diligence costs, legal fees, accounting fees, and 
investment banking fees. These expenditures account for millions, if not 
billions, of dollars in expenses on an annual basis. As such, the tax char-
acterization of these expenditures, i.e., whether they are capital expenses 
or ordinary business expenses, has significant ramifications on the tax 
liability of the taxpayer and, consequently, on the revenue collected by 
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"). 
* Copyright© 2001 by Jeffery R. Atkin. 
I. See Martin Sikora, M&A A/mnnac-1999 M&A Profile, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS J., 
Feb. I, 2000. 
2. See id. The statistics were supplied by the Mergers & Corporate Transactions Database of 
Thomson Financial Securities Data Co. 
Jd. 
The ... information [was] based on all completed mergers, acquisitions, and divestitures 
priced at $5 million and over, as well as purchases of partial interest that involved at least 
a 40% stake in the target company or an investment of at least $100 million. Except 
where noted, the data only cover transactions in which American companies were on both 
sides of the deal or were on at least one side as buyer or seller. 
3. See id. 
4. See M&A Scoreboard 2nd Q 2000, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS J., Sept I, 2000. 
5. Although different in nature and form, for purposes of this Note, the terms "merger" and 
"acquisition" are used interchangeably. Additionally, the Note uses terms such as "deal" and "trans-
action" to signify the event that has occurred or will occur to which the expenditures at issue are 
related. 
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The question of what expenditures may be deducted and what must 
be capitalized has long been controversial.6 This basic tax question has 
been around since the enactment of the income tax. More recently, it was 
the question at issue in Wells Fargo & Co. and Subsidiaries v. Commis-
sioner ("Wells Fargo").7 
In Wells Fargo, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part 
the Tax Court's holding that pre-closing investigatory/legal fees and of-
ficers' salaries attributable to the merger must be capitalized. In doing so, 
the court explained that the Tax Court had misinterpreted the Supreme 
Court's opinion in INDOPCO Inc. v. Commissioner.8 
This Note seeks to explain the basic law with respect to the tax con-
sequences of the pre-merger expenditures at issue. In particular, the Note 
seeks to explain why the Eighth Circuit was correct in its interpretation 
and application of INDOPCO as it relates to the specific expenditures at 
issue in Wells Fargo-namely, investigatory/legal fees and officers' 
salaries attributable to the merger. Part II outlines the relevant sections of 
the Internal Revenue Code and briefly summarizes the historical case 
law. Part III explains the history of the Wells Fargo case, including the 
facts, the Tax Court's opinion, and the Eighth Circuit's opinion. Part IV 
analyzes the deductibility of the legal fees and officers' salaries at issue 
in the case. Part V summarizes the Note and concludes that the Eighth 
Circuit properly allowed the expenses to be currently deductible. 
II. RELEVANT CODE SECTIONS AND CASE LAW 
A. Applicable Code Sections 
Section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) allows for a 
deduction for all "ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred dur-
ing the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business .... "9 This in-
cludes "salaries or other compensation for personal services actually ren-
dered."10 
Section 263 prohibits deductions for amounts "paid out for new 
buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments made to in-
6. See Ellen Macneil, et. al., Tax Accounting Issues in Mergers and Acquisitions, in 2 TAX 
STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES, 
FINANCING, REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCTURINGS 923, 954 (PLI Tax Law & Estate Planning 
Course Handbook Series No. J-404, 1997) [hereinafter Macneil]. 
7. 224 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2000). 
8. See generally !NDOPCO Inc. v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79 (1992). 
9. I.R.C. § 162(a) ( 1994 ). All Code sections refer to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as 
amended, and the regulations thereunder, unless otherwise noted. 
10. I.R.C. § 162(a)(l) (1994). 
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crease the value of any property or estate." 11 These items must be capital-
ized.12 Treasury Regulation 1.263(a)-2(a) provides that capital expendi-
tures include "[t ]he cost of acquisition, construction, or erection of build-
ings, machinery and equipment, furniture and fixtures, and similar 
property having a useful life substantially beyond the taxable year." 13 
B. Historical Case Law 
Prior to INDOPCO, the case law concerning outlays in relation to the 
expansion of a business was somewhat in disarray. 14 Nonetheless, the 
courts generally had ruled that costs incurred in expanding an existing 
business were deductible. 15 In determining what constituted the expan-
sion of an existing trade or business, the courts generally focused on 
whether the taxpayer obtained a "separate and distinct additional asset." 16 
Many courts concluded that if a business expenditure could not be rea-
sonably allocated to a specific asset, then it should not be capitalized but 
immediately deducted as an expense. 17 
Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner18 was the principal case 
permitting businesses to deduct expansion costs. In Briarcliff Candy, a 
candy manufacturer that had historically sold its products to stores down-
town sought to expand by selling to suburban retailers. Consequently, 
Briarcliff Candy incurred significant promotional costs and costs in ne-
gotiating franchise contracts with the suburban retailers. The Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals found that these expenditures did not create any 
separate and distinct asset and thus were currently deductible. 19 The court 
II. I.R.C.§263(1994). 
12. Treas. Regs. § 1.263(a)-2 (1994). This regulation lists examples of capital expenditures 
and explains that section 263 disallows deductions for the cost of acquiring property "having a use-
ful life substantially beyond the taxable year." !d. at § 1.263(a)-2(a) (1994). Thus, any item falling 
within the interpretation of section 263 is characterized as a capital expenditure and must be capital-
ized rather than deducted as a current expense. This does not mean that the expenditure will never be 
recovered. Expenditures for most assets are amortized over the useful life of the asset. Nonetheless, 
some assets, like merger-related costs, start-up costs and land are assumed to have a perpetual or 
indefinite useful life, thus the expenditure is not recovered until the property is sold or the business is 
terminated. 
13. Treas. Regs.§ 1.263(a)-2(a) (1994). 
14. See NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982) (finding that expenses 
incurred by expanding bank were deductible because no new asset was created); Briarcliff Candy 
Corp. v. Comm'r, 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973) (finding that expenses were currently deductible be-
cause there was no separate and distinct asset); but see Central Tex. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United 
States, 731 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1984); Bilar Tool & Dye v. Comm'r, 530 F.2d 708 (6th Cir. 1976). 
15. See Javaras & Maynes, 534 T.M. Start-up Expenditures (BNA Tax Mgmt. Portfolios 
1997) [hereinafter Javaras & Maynes]. 
16. !d.§ IV at A-19. 
17. See supra note 14. 
18. 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973). 
19. See Briarcliff Candy, 475 F.2d at 782. 
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derived the "separate and distinct additional asset" test from the Supreme 
Court's decision in Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass 'n. 20 
In INDOPCO, the Supreme Court held that expenditures incurred in 
evaluating a friendly takeover had to be capitalized.21 In so doing, it 
seemed to reject key precedents like Briarcliff Candy. The Supreme 
Court found the expenditures had to be capitalized because of the factual 
finding that the acquisition produced a long-term benefit. The Court did 
not rely on the "separate and distinct asset" test.22 
III. THE HISTORY OF WELLS FARGO 
A. General Facts ofWells Fargo 
Norwest,23 Bettendorf Bank,24 and Davenport25 were the parties to 
the original transaction. In short, the transaction consisted of the consoli-
dation of Davenport and Bettendorf to form New Davenport with New 
Davenport being a subsidiary of Norwest. 
In 1989, due to new interstate banking legislation adopted in Iowa, 
Davenport's management believed that larger outside banks would enter 
the Quad Cities area,26 and Davenport would be unable to compete?7 
Shortly thereafter, Norwest discussed with Davenport the possibility of 
joining the businesses. These merger discussions intensified in early 
1991, at which time Davenport retained the law firm of Lane & Water-
man ("L & W") to represent and assist them. L & W researched whether 
Davenport would strategically fit with Norwest and whether the reor-
ganization would benefit the community.28 
20. 403 U.S. 345 (1971). 
21. See INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 79. 
22. ld. 
23. NoiWest, incorporated in 1929, is a bank holding company that is the parent corporation 
of an affiliated group of corporations including 79 commercial banks in 12 states and other financial 
services corporations. See Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d at 876. The facts outlined in this section are those 
facts adopted in Wells Fargo. 
24. Bettendorf Bank, National Association ("Bettendorf'), is a member of the NoiWest con-
solidated group. See id. at 876. 
25. Davenport, incorporated in 1932, is an Iowa State Bank with a main office in Davenport 
and four branches, three in Davenport, and one in Donahue, Iowa. Davenport originally provided 
banking services in the four-city area that consists of Davenport, Bettendorf, Rock Island, IL, and 
Moline, IL ("Quad Cities Area"). See id. at 876-77. 
26. See id. 
27. See id. at 877. Davenport's management was particularly concerned with its size. Daven-
port was larger than the small community banks but smaller than the large regional banks. /d. 
28. See id. 
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On June 10, 1991, Davenport's board met to consider the merger of 
Davenport into Norwest.29 The board authorized executive officers to 
negotiate with Norwest and appointed a special committee to perform an 
independent due diligence review, obtain professional advice, and report 
as to the fairness of the proposed transaction. 30 
On July 22, 1991, Davenport's board met to discuss the transaction 
consisting of the consolidation of Davenport and Bettendorf to form New 
Davenport, which would be a wholly owned subsidiary of Norwest.31 Af-
ter the special committee recommended that the transaction be approved 
and J.P. Morgan opined that it was fair, Davenport's board approved the 
transaction. Similarly, Bettendorf's board approved the transaction. 
On the same day, the parties agreed to the transaction subject to cer-
tain approvals.32 Immediately after the agreement, Norwest, with the as-
sistance of Davenport employees and L & W, began performing a due 
diligence review on Davenport. L & W acted as the primary contact be-
tween Norwest and Davenport. 33 
At a special shareholder's meeting, on November 26, 1991, Daven-
port's shareholders approved the transaction.34 A few weeks later, Bet-
tendorf's shareholders approved the transaction. 35 The consolidation of 
Davenport and Bettendorf became effective on January 19, 1992, and at 
12:01 a.m. the transaction became effective.36 The board and manage-
ment of Davenport believed that the transaction would provide signifi-
cant long-term benefits for Davenport and its shareholders.37 
For 1991, Davenport alleged that $111,270 of the legal expenses 
should be deductible. Of the $111,270, $83,450 was paid for services 
rendered in investigating the products, services, and reputation of Nor-
west and determining whether the Norwest and Bettendorf consolidation 
would fit well into the business community.38 The $83,450 was for ser-
vices rendered prior to July 21, 1991, and none of it was for services re-
lating to negotiating price, working on the fairness opinion, advising 
29. See id. 
30. See id. 
31. New Davenport would be a national bank that would be wholly owned by Norwest. See 
id. 
32. See id. In particular, the parties agreed to the transaction subject to regulatory approvals, 
approval of Davenport's and Bettendorfs shareholders, and a positive tax opinion. 
33. See id. 
34. See id. at 878. 
35. See id. 
36. See id. at 878-79. 
37. See id. at 878. The merger would enable the bank to offer a wider array of products and 
services. See id. 
38. See id. 
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Davenport's board with respect to its fiduciary duties, or satisfying secu-
rities law requirements.39 
Additionally, Davenport deducted $150,000 on its federal income tax 
return for 1999 for the officers' salaries attributable to the services per-
formed in the transaction.40 None of the officers were specifically hired 
to facilitate the merger. The officers carried on the normal day-to-day ac-
tivities of Davenport, and the merger did not affect the officers' sala-
ries.41 
B. The Tax Court's Decision in Norwest 
Wells Fargo began in the Tax Court as Norwest Corp. and 
Subsidiaries v. Commissioner.42 In Norwest, the Tax Court followed its 
previous position and held that Davenport, the target company, was not 
entitled to deduct pre-transaction investigatory and due diligence costs 
incurred by the target company.43 In addition, the Tax Court held that the 
salaries of Davenport's officers were not deductible to the extent that the 
salaries were attributable to the officers' work on the transaction.44 
In rejecting Norwest's arguments that the fees and costs should be 
immediately deducted because they were ordinary and necessary ex-
penses and that INDOPCO was not controlling because it did not over-
rule the line of cases allowing such costs to be deducted,45 the Tax Court 
explained that it interpreted INDOPCO to have displaced the body of law 
in Briarcliff Candy and its progeny. The court opined that, although a 
separate and distinct asset may not have been created, an expense is still 
not "ordinary" if it "generates a significant long-term benefit that extends 
beyond the end of the taxable year."46 
39. See id. 
40. See id. at 880. 
41. See id. 
42. 112 T.C. 89 (1999). This was the Tax Court case for the Wells Fargo case discussed in 
this Note. NoJWest was litigating as a successor in interest to Davenport Bank. By the time of the 
appeal, Wells Fargo had merged with NoJWest, thus accounting for the various changes in the party 
names. 
43. See id. at 90; see also Mark J. Silverman & Andrew J. Weinstein, Tax Treatment of Re-
organization Costs, in TAX STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, 
JOINT VENTURES, FINANCING, REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCTURINGS, 1131, 1147 (PLI Tax Law 
and Estate Planning Course Handbook Series No. J0-002R, 2000) [hereinafter Silverman & 
Weinstein"]; Gary L. Maydew, To Deduct or Capitalize: Courts and IRS Interpret INDOPCO, 63 
PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 145, 147 (Sept. 1999) [hereinafter Maydew]. 
44. See Norwest, 112 T.C. at 90. 
45. See Briarcliff Candy, 475 F.2d at 775; NCNB, 684 F.2d at 285. These cases allowed for 
the deduction of investigatory and due diligence costs incurred incident to the business expansion. 
46. Norwest, 112 T.C. at 97 (citing INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 79). 
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The Tax Court went on to explain that in two prior cases it had re-
quired the capitalization of acquisition-related expenditures.47 The court 
held that in both cases, as in INDOPCO, the expenses (investigatory 
costs, due diligence costs, and professional services fees) had to be capi-
talized because the expenditures were incurred incident to a friendly 
takeover from which significant long-term benefits would be derived.48 
Norwest argued that its case was distinguishable from those cases be-
cause its costs were not a direct cost of the corporate acquisition but were 
incurred before and incidental to the acquisition. The Tax Court was un-
persuaded by Norwest's argument and responded that they were "pre-
paratory expenses" and that, according to INDOPCO, "the costs must be 
capitalized because they are connected to an event (namely, the merger) 
that produced a significant long-term benefit."49 
The Tax Court did not explain why the officers' salaries were to be 
capitalized. It merely stated in its general findings that "all costs were 
sufficiently related to an event that produced a significant long-term 
benefit."50 The court disallowed the deductions for these salaries. 
C. Wells Fargo & Company and Subsidiaries v. Commissioner 
1. General background ofWells Fargo 
After the transaction at issue, Norwest was acquired by Wells Fargo. 
The case went directly to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit51 
from the Tax Court.52 The Court of Appeals, reversing in part the Tax 
Court, concluded that the Tax Court had misread JNDOPCO and that the 
$150,000 of officers' salaries in dispute and $83,450 of legal fees, which 
were incurred prior to Davenport's final decision, were fully deducti-
ble.53 
47. See Norwest, 112 T.C. at 99-100 (discussing Victory Mkts., Inc. & Subs. v. Commiss'r, 
99 T.C. 648 (1992) and A.E. Staley Mtg. Co. & Subs. v. Comm'r, 105 T.C. 166 (1995), rev'd and 
rerrwnded, 119 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 1997)). 
48. See id. There has been some distinction between friendly takeovers and hostile takeovers. 
Although it is not the topic of this Note, it is important to understand the current distinctions. Many 
have argued and some courts have agreed that in a hostile takeover, it is "necessary" and "ordinary" 
to defend in order to maintain the ongoing company, so expenses related to successfully defeating a 
hostile takeover should be immediately deducted. Nonetheless, it is clear that fees incurred in an 
unsuccessful merger, even if friendly, are currently deductible. See Silverman & Weinstein, supra 
note 43, at 1131. 
49. Norwest, 112. T.C. at I 00. 
50. !d. at 102. 
51. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals is referred to in the Note as the "Eighth Circuit" or 
the "Court of Appeals." 
52. See Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d at 876. 
53. See id. at 889. 
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2. The Eighth Circuit's analysis of the case 
The Court of Appeals began its analysis by explaining the basic 
foundation and distinction between capitalization and deductibility of 
expenses.54 1t then outlined the Supreme Court's precedent and explained 
how and why the Tax Court had erred. 
a. The Supreme Court's precedent. The Court of Appeals explained 
how and why the Tax Court erred in its interpretation and application of 
INDOPCO by likening the alleged error in logical reasoning made by the 
Tax Court to similar logical fallacies among the circuit courts of appeal 
in interpreting Lincoln Savings,55 and the Supreme Court's attempt to 
clarify Lincoln Savings in its holding in INDOPCO. 
The issue in Lincoln Savings was whether the Savings and Loan as-
sociation could deduct an "additional prernium."56 In finding that the ad-
ditional premium must be capitalized, the Supreme Court stated that the 
presence of a "future benefit" is not controlling and that it was important 
and controlling that "a separate and distinct asset" had been created.57 
The Eighth Circuit explained that at least five circuit courts of appeal er-
roneously interpreted this language to mean that the Supreme Court had 
adopted a new "separate and distinct additional asset" test that allowed 
necessary business expenditures to be fully deductible unless the expen-
diture "created or enhanced a separate and distinct additional asset."58 
The Eighth Circuit illustrated the fallacy through the use of basic 
logical symbols, equations, and diagrams in relation to Lincoln Savings.59 
54. It began by explaining that under the I.R.C., section 162 allows deductions for "all the 
ordinary and necessary expenses." However, section 263 does not allow deductions for capital ex-
penditures-"an amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments 
made to increase the value of any property or estate." The Court then explained that the dispute is 
centered around "whether the expenses in this case can properly be characterized as 'ordinary."' See 
id. If the expense is "ordinary," then it may be fully deducted. On the other hand, if it is not ordinary, 
it is a capital expense and must be depreciated over the life of the underlying asset, or where no spe-
cific asset or useful life exists, the expense is deducted upon dissolution of the enterprise. See id. 
(citing INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 83-84). 
55. See id. 
56. See id. at 881; see also Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 403 U.S. 345, 345 
( 1971 ). In Lincoln Savinxs, the Savings and Loan companies were initially required to pay only one 
premium to the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, but beginning 1962, the compa-
nies were required to pay an "additional premium" that funded the Secondary Reserve. Lincoln Sav-
ings had a property interest in the Secondary Reserve. /d. at 354. 
57. Lincoln Savinxs, 403 U.S. at 354. 
58. Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d at 881. See, e.g., Briarcliff" Candy, 475 F.2d at 775; NCNB, 684 
F.2d at 285; Central Tex. Sav. & Loan, 731 F.2d at 1181; Colorado Springs Nat'! Bank v. United 
States, 505 F.2d 1185 (I Oth Cir. 1974); First Sec. Bank of Idaho v. Comm'r, 592 F.2d I 050 (9th Cir. 
1979). 
59. Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d at 881. The court used the following symbols for its equations: 
A = physical capital ASSET created or enhanced; 
NOT A = NO physical capital ASSET created or enhanced; 
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In Lincoln Savings, the Supreme Court held that if an expenditure creates 
or enhances a separate and distinct asset, then it must be capitalized.60 In 
terms of the logical equation, this holding would read as "if A then C."61 
The Eighth Circuit explained that the logical error occurred when the cir-
cuit courts read "if A then C" as if it read "only if A then C."62 In addi-
tion, Lincoln Savings held that "the presence of an ensuing benefit that 
may have some future aspect is not controlling; many expenses conced-
edly deductible have prospective effect beyond the taxable year."63 The 
Eighth Circuit explained that this was misinterpreted to mean that the fu-
ture benefit was irrelevant when determining if an expenditure must be 
capitalized-a holding in error with what Lincoln Savings actually 
held.64 
b. The court's analysis ofiNDOPCO. After years of confusion among 
the circuit courts, as illustrated above, the Supreme Court issued 
INDOPC065 to clarify the holding in Lincoln Savings. Writing for the 
Court in INDOPCO, Justice Blackmun clarified: 
Lincoln Savings stands for the simple proposition that a taxpayer's ex-
penditure that serves to create or enhance ... a separate and distinct as-
B= BENEFIT beyond the taxable year; 
NOT B = NO benefit beyond the taxable year; 
R= the expense is directly Related to B; 
NOT R= the expense is only indirectly Related to B; 
C= CAPITALIZE; 
NOT C= do NOT Capitalize (this can be equal to a deduction). 
!d. See also WADDELL, WARD JR., STRUCTURE OF LAWS: As REPRESENTED BY SYMBOLIC ME-
THODS I (1961). 
60. See Lincoln SavinRs, 403 U.S. at 354. 
61. Wells FarRo, 224 F. 3d at 882. See note 59 and accompanying text for explanations of the 
symbols. 
!d. 
62. See id. The court further explained variations of the mistake in logic: 
Clearly, the two statements are different and yield different results. Another way to mis-
state the holding of Lincoln SavinKS is to say "if NOT A then NOT C, but this too is not 
interchangeable with the actual holding, "if A then C." An equally poor reading of the 
term "if A then C," would be "if C then A" Unless two terms are proven to be reflexive 
of one another, they can not be haphazardly interchanged. And yet these are the very mis-
takes in logic that some Circuits were laboring under while misinterpreting Lincoln Sav-
inRs. By establishing a "new test" which would not require capitalization unless a new 
asset was created, those courts were reading Lincoln Savings to hold one of the follow-
ing: I) "if C then A", 2) "only if A then Cor 3) "if NOT A then NOT C," none of which 
is equivalent to the true holding, "if A then C." 
63. Lincoln SavinKS, 403 U.S. at 354. 
64. Wells FarRo, 224 F.3d 882. In the logic terms outlined, the court re-wrote the statement 
in Lincoln Saving~ to read: "B not= C." (B does not equal C). The court then explained: "This sim-
ply is not true. When determining whether a necessary business expenditure must be capitalized or 
deducted, it is of critical importance to determine whether the expenditure resulted in a long term 
benefit." !d. (citing JNDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 87-88). 
65. JNDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 79. 
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set should be capitalized under § 263. It by no means follows, however, 
that only expenditures that create or enhance separated and distinct as-
sets are to be capitalized under§ 263. 
In short, Lincoln Savings holds that the creation of a separate and dis-
tinct asset well may be a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition to 
classification as a capital expenditure.66 
According to the Eighth Circuit, INDOPCO clarifies that if an ex-
penditure creates a separate and distinct asset then it must be capitalized 
and no further analysis need be done (if A then C); but if the expenditure 
does not create a new capital asset, further inquiry must be performed.67 
The Eighth Circuit went on to explain that according to INDOPCO, 
even when a particular expenditure does not create a new asset (NOT A), 
there are situations where the expense must still be capitalized (C). How-
ever, there are also occasions when such expenditures may be deducted. 
Hence, the court concluded, "if NOT A then (C or D)."68 It then ex-
plained that determining whether to capitalize (C) or deduct (D) depends 
in part on the long-term benefit of the asset. "If there is not a long term 
benefit (B) associated with the expenditure, then the appropriate tax 
treatment is current deduction."69 On the other hand, the court stated that 
there is not an easy answer if the expenditure does not create a new asset, 
but does provide a long-term benefit.70 
c. The Tax Court's illogical reading of INDOPCO. The Court of Ap-
peals explained that the Tax Court's first mistake was its failure to sepa-
rate the officers' salaries from the investigatory/legal expenses and per-
form independent analyses to determine their deductibility. Second, the 
Eighth Circuit, through the use of logical equations, illustrated how the 
Tax Court erroneously interpreted INDOPCO to require capitalization of 
the expenses simply because the expenditures were incidentally con-
nected with a future benefit.71 In particular, the Tax Court held: "In ac-
cordance with INDOPCO [sic], [all] the costs must be capitalized be-
cause they are connected to an event (namely, the transaction) that 
66. See id. at 86-87. As the Eighth Circuit explained, "INDOPCO clearly and unequivocally 
demonstrates that statements such as "only if A then C," and "if NOT A then NOT C" are false 
statements." Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d at 883. 
67. See Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d at 883. 
68. /d. at 884. 
69. /d. The court further explained that this is because the Code seeks to match expenses with 
the revenues of the taxable period to which they are associated. 
70. See id. The court supports this by quoting INDOPCO where Justice Blackmun explained: 
"The Court has recognized, however, that the 'decisive distinctions' between current expenses and 
capital expenditures 'are those of degree and not of kind,' and that because each case 'turns on its 
special facts,' the cases sometimes appear difficult to harmonize." /d. (internal citations omitted). 
71. See id. at 886. 
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produced a significant long-term benefit."72 The Eighth Circuit con-
cluded: 
This is a misinterpretation of INDOPCO. The Tax Court is saying that 
C must result because of the presence of B. This is equivalent to "if B 
then C," which we have previously proven to be a false statement. 
Herein lies the mistake of the Tax Court. Just as the Court in Lincoln 
Savings did not create a new test for determining whether current de-
duction or capitalization is the proper tax consequence of an expendi-
ture, it also did not create a new test in the INDOPCO case. Therefore, 
it is not proper to decide that a cost must be capitalized solely because 
the fact finder determines that the cost is "incidentally connected" with 
a long term benefit.73 
d. The court found Davenport's officers' salaries were a fully 
deductible expense. The court rejected the Tax Court's holding that the 
officers' salaries must be capitalized. Instead, it found that the salaries 
were directly related to the employment relationship but only indirectly 
related to the acquisition, and, therefore, the salary expenses were de-
ductible.74 The Eighth Circuit, applying the "origin of the claim doctrine" 
and somewhat persuaded by many private letter rulings of the IRS, 
agreed that the expenses in INDOPCO were directly related to the trans-
action that produced the long-term benefit and so needed to be capital-
ized. 75 However, the court distinguished those expenses from the offi-
cers' salaries by explaining that the salary expenditures at issue were 
only indirectly related to the long-term benefit (the acquisition); conse-
quently, the salaries could be deducted.76 
e. A portion of Davenport's legal/investigatory expenses were de-
ductible. The court allowed $83,450 of the $111,270 of legal fees in dis-
pute to be deducted. The Commissioner apparently changed his position 
with respect to the expenditures that it determined were attributable to 
the "investigatory stage" of the transaction and agreed with the taxpayer 
72. /d. at 885 (quoting Norwest, 112 T.C. at 100). 
73. /d. (internal footnotes omitted). The court went on to explain that this is supported by 
both Lincoln Savings and /NDOPCO. See Lincoln Savings & Loan., 403 U.S. at 354 (stating that 
"many expenses concededly deductible have prospective effect beyond the taxable year"); 
INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 87 (noting that "the mere presence of an incidental future benefit-'some 
future aspect'-may not warrant capitalization"). 
74. See Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d at 888. 
75. See id. 
76. See id. at 887-88. See Woodward v. Comm'r, 397 U.S. 572 (1970); United States v. Hil-
ton Hotels Corp., 397 U.S. 580 (1970); Deputy v. duPont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940); TAM 95-40-003 
(June 30, 1995); PLR 93-26-001 (Mar. 18, 1993); TAM 95-27-005 (Mar. 15, 1995); TAM 97-21-
002 (Jan. 24, 1997); TAM 97-31-001 (Jan. 31, 1997). 
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that such expenses should be deducted, not capitalized. The Commis-
sioner attributed $83,450 of the expenses to the "investigatory stage."77 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The question of whether to capitalize or deduct acquisition-related 
expenses has long been a controversial one. Some courts have made dis-
tinctions between friendly takeovers and other takeovers, such as hostile 
or abandoned takeovers.78 Although this area of tax law may be unclear, 
it is clear that the courts have raised the bar, making it more difficult for 
a taxpayer to deduct a pre-acquisition expenses.79 In INDOPCO, the Su-
preme Court asserted that capitalization is the norm and deductions are 
the exception, and that creation of a separate and distinct asset never was 
necessary to require capitalization.80 While the IRS has been somewhat 
moderate in its position with respect to pre-merger expenses, the Tax 
Court has been aggressive in interpreting INDOPCO as unfavorable to 
taxpayers. 81 Wells Fargo is an example of the Tax Court taking an ag-
gressive position in applying its interpretation of INDOPC0. 82 On ap-
peal, the Eighth Circuit ruled that the Tax Court was too aggressive in its 
interpretation and held that certain pre-transaction investigatory costs 
were currently deductible.83 
After the Supreme Court's decision in INDOPCO, many authors 
have commented that it has become very difficult for companies to de-
duct acquisition-related expenditures. 84 Indeed, one author even sug-
gested that "[a]fter the [INDOPCO] decision, there seems to be very little 
to discuss regarding the deductibility of takeover costs incurred where a 
77. !d. 
78. See Silverman & Weinstein, supra note 43, at I I 39. This Note focuses on the limited 
scope of the holding in Wells Fargo. For other types of transactions, see MARTIN D. GINSBURG & 
JACKS. LEVIN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND BUYOUTS (2000) (hereinafter GINSBURG & LEVIN]. 
79. See Maydew, supra note 43. 
80. See INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 84. 
8 I. See Maydew, supra note 43, at I 52. 
82. See id. 
83. See Wells Fargo, 224 F. 3d at 874. 
84. See Maydew, supra note 43, at 146. Gary Maydew of Iowa State University explained: 
The Court obviously did not want the tax definition of a capital asset narrowed to the ex-
tent that taxpayers could expense all expenditures that did not create separate and identi-
fiable assets. 
The application of INDOPCO by the lower courts has made it very difficult for compa-
nies to deduct acquisition costs incurred in a friendly takeover. The Tax Court, in particu-
lar, has relied on INDOPCO to eliminate the deductibility of these acquisition costs. 
!d. See also Macneil, supra note 6, at 975. 
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board willingly approves a takeover."85 The IRS and the Tax Court have 
been very aggressive in not allowing deductions. 86 
In one of its more recent attempts to require capitalization, the Tax 
Court held in Norwest that the portion of regular and ordinary salaries of 
a bank's officers (salaries that were payable regardless of the merger and 
not affected by the merger) attributable to the time spent analyzing a po-
tential merger were not currently deductible as an operating expense, but 
had to be capitalized.87 The Tax Court's holding in Norwest has been 
criticized by some authors as "wrong."88 Moreover, others have sug-
gested that the INDOPCO decision is being "asserted out of context by 
overly aggressive revenue agents."89 The Eighth Circuit agreed and in 
Wells Fargo reversed the Tax Court finding that the officers' salaries and 
part of the investigatory/legal fees were currently deductible.90 
This portion of the Note explores the tax consequences of the 
merger-related expenses incurred in the Wells Fargo case, namely, pre-
merger investigatory and legal fees and officers' salaries attributable to 
the merger. This Note does not seek to establish a new test, or recom-
mend a new test that would miraculously and easily resolve all contro-
versy.91 The Note will, however, seek to analyze and explain that the 
court of appeals in Wells Fargo correctly concluded that the expenditures 
at issue were deductible because: (1) case law supports the holding; (2) it 
is consistent with the legislative history of section 195 of the I.R.C.; (3) 
the IRS's own positions support it; and (4) public policy requires it. 
As the Eighth Circuit explained, the two expenditures at issue are in-
herently different and, because of the positions taken by the parties, will 
92 be analyzed separately. 
85. Macneil, supra note 6, at 975. 
86. See Silverman & Weinstein, supra note 43. 
87. See Norwest, 112 T.C. 89, No.9; see also Curtis Elliott & Christopher E. Hannum, The 
Chaos of!NDOPCO and Value Creation: Long-term Business Expansion or Recovery?, 90 J. TAX'N 
338 (June 1999) [hereinafter Elliott & Hannum]. 
88. See GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 78, at 4-16 ("We believe Norwest was wrongly de-
cided to the extent that it concluded none of the investigatory expenses were deductible business 
expansion costs."). 
89. Elliott & Hannum, supra note 87, at 339. 
90. See Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d at 889. 
91. One author, after explaining that most of the time either parties just "admit" to future 
benefit or the courts simply "equate" benefit without really evaluating the value: 
The controversy created by INDOPCO will not be put to rest until legislation clarifies 
this issue or the Supreme Court undertakes a renewed examination of the area. Until ei-
ther of these events occur, taxpayers will continue to find what otherwise would be con-
sidered traditional ongoing expenses to be in jeopardy unless they support deductibility 
through sufficient preparation and logical strategies. 
Elliott & Hannum, supra note 87, at 357. 
92. As the court in Wells Fargo explained, the Tax Court erred "when it failed to perform an 
independent analysis to determine the fate of Davenport's officers' salaries, and another for the in-
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A. Investigatory Expenditures Incurred Before the "Final Decision" Are 
Deductible 
The controversy over what pre-merger legal and investigatory costs 
in a friendly merger may be deducted has largely been resolved and 
therefore will not be discussed in detail in this Note. Originally, the 
Commissioner had argued that all such expenditures must be capitalized. 
However, after Norwest, the Commissioner changed his position regard-
ing investigatory/legal expenditures.93 On appeal, the Commissioner 
conceded that he had been wrong and that the Tax Court had erred in re-
quiring capitalization of all the costs.94 In fact, the Commissioner agreed 
that legal expenses "attributable to the investigatory stage of the transac-
tion" may be deducted.95 Thus, the only material issue remaining was the 
question of how to define what constituted "investigatory costs."96 Ac-
cording to I.R.C. section I 95's legislative history, investigatory expenses 
are those incurred prior to the "final decision to acquire or to enter" a 
particular business.97 The IRS determined that deductible investigatory 
costs are those "which are related to the questions 'whether to acquire a 
business' and 'which business to acquire."'98 Once the "final decision" is 
made to acquire a particular business, further investigatory costs "be-
vestigatory costs associated with the acquisition." Wells Fargo, 224 F. 3d at 885. 
93. See id. at 888. 
94. See id. Because the IRS is the body enforcing the tax laws, as a practical matter, the posi-
tion taken by the Commissioner can generally be relied upon as the governing law. 
95. /d. (internal quotations omitted). 
96. !d. 
97. S. REP. No. 96-1036, at II (1980). 
98. Wells Fargo, 224 F. 3d at 889. Levin explained: 
The meaning of "final decision" is not entirely clear. One rational approach would be that 
P has made a final decision to acquire T only when it has signed a binding agreement to 
acquire T and no longer has a discretionary right to withdraw from the transaction, e.g., a 
general due diligence out (as opposed to a right to withdraw only forT's breach of a spe-
cific representation or warranty, e.g., a material adverse change out). Under this ap-
proach, if P signed a binding contract to acquire T, which gave P a general due diligence 
out, a final decision would be made at the earlier of expiration of the due diligence out or 
closing of the acquisition. 
At the other end of the spectrum, P could be viewed as having made a final decision to 
acquire T when it entered into a non-binding letter of intent to acquire T or perhaps even 
earlier when P made an offer to acquire T. 
In Rev. Rul. 99-23, IRS opted for the latter approach, stating: 
The "final decision" referred to in the legislative history of section 195 is the point at 
which a taxpayer makes its decision whether to acquire a business, and which business to 
acquire, rather than the point at which a taxpayer and seller are legally obligated to com-
plete the transaction ... Accordingly, expenditures incurred in the course of a general 
search for, or an investigation of, an active trade or business, i.e., expenditures paid or in-
curred in order to determine whether to enter a new business and which new business to 
enter ... , are investigatory costs that are start-up expenditures under section 195 .... 
GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 78, at 4-12. 
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come expenses attributable to facilitating consummation of the acquisi-
tion" and as such are not deductible.99 The Eighth Circuit correctly con-
cluded that there is no "bright line rule" for determining when the "final 
decision" occurred, but that it must instead be determined on a case-by-
case basis. 100 
The frustrating result emerging from the holding in Wells Fargo is 
that it does not give much guidance as to when the "final decision" oc-
curs. Obviously, having a bright line rule would make it easier to deter-
mine when the "final decision" occurred. However, having a case-by-
case rule has various benefits. Each transaction and negotiation is differ-
ent and thus the "final decisions" are likely to occur at different stages of 
the transaction depending on the parties. The case-by-case rule gives the 
court the flexibility to more closely determine when the final decision 
actually occurred. Along the same lines, establishing a bright line rule 
could lead to wide spread taxpayer abuse. For example, if the "final deci-
sion" were to be established as occurring when the board formally ap-
proved the transaction or when the letter of intent was signed, then com-
panies could incur substantial investigatory expenses and simply delay 
performing the event that would trigger the "final decision." Conse-
quently, companies could shift costs "attributable to facilitating con-
summation of the acquisition," which generally must be capitalized, into 
pre-"final decision" costs that could be deductible. This would violate 
the underlying principle that only costs related to the questions of 
"whether to acquire a business" and "which business to acquire" are 
properly deductible. 101 Moreover, under a bright line rule, companies 
may be able to avoid the "final decision" altogether. For example, if the 
signing of a letter of intent constituted the "final decision," companies 
could simply not sign a letter of intent. Thus, the case-by-case approach 
is appropriate. 
B. The Court Correctly Concluded that the Officers' Salaries Were 
Deductible 
This Note concludes that case law, the legislative history of section 
195, the IRS's own positions, and public policy support the Eighth Cir-
cuit's ruling that the officers' salaries were deductible. 
99. Wells Far~:o, 224 F.3d at 889. 
I 00. /d. ("Our detennination on this point is not to be construed as a 'bright line rule' for de-
tennining when a 'final decision' has been made. The facts and circumstances of each case must be 
evaluated independently to make a proper finding on that issue."). 
101. Seeid. 
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1. Case law supports deducting the officers' salaries 
Traditionally, the courts have allowed officers' salaries, similar to 
those in this case, to be currently deducted. 102 However, the Tax Court 
clearly took the position that acquisition-related expenses in a friendly 
transaction must be capitalized. The Tax Court committed three fatal 
flaws in reaching this conclusion. First, in its apparent decision to expand 
the scope of INDOPCO, the court failed to separately analyze the distinct 
and unique expenditures at issue. Secondly, the court further erred by 
confusing the argument that the salaries were only indirectly related to 
the merger with being one of timing. Thirdly, it misinterpreted 
INDOPCO as requiring all pre-acquisition expenses to be capitalized. 103 
The two expenditures at issue-legal/investigatory fees and officers' 
salaries-are very different in nature and thus needed to be analyzed 
separately. Although some of the legal/investigatory fees may have been 
incurred prior to the "final decision," the fees were clearly related to the 
transaction. Had there never been merger talks, the fees would not have 
arisen. On the other hand, the officers' salaries had always existed. The 
merger in no way affected the salaries the officers received. Even if there 
were no merger talks, the officers would have received the same com-
pensation. By failing to separate the two expenditures, the Tax Court set 
itself up for failure. 
The salaries at issue here were only indirectly related to the merger 
and thus are distinguishable from the other costs. The Tax Court clearly 
recognized that INDOPCO dealt with costs that were "directly" related to 
the corporate acquisition while the costs in the case at bar were only "in-
cidentally" or "indirectly" related to the corporate acquisition. 104 None-
theless, the Tax Court refused to distinguish between direct and indirect 
costs and consequently did not allow the taxpayer to deduct the indirectly 
related officers' salaries. In reaching this conclusion, the Tax Court 
wrongly equated the fact that the salaries were only indirect costs with 
that of timing. The Tax Court never analyzed or explained why officer 
salaries were required to be capitalized when those salaries had always 
been paid and would be paid regardless of the merger and had no asso-
ciation with the merger other than some unexplained allocation of time 
that the officers spent on pre-merger issues. The Tax Court simply con-
cluded that it believed that any pre-transaction costs that provided "long-
term benefit" must be capitalized regardless of whether "management 
102. See. e.g., id. at 874; Dixie Frosted Foods, Inc. v. Comm'r, 6 T.C.M. (CCH) 586 (1947); 
Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Comm'r, 49 T.C. 275 (1967). 
103. See Norwest, 112 T.C. at 100. 
104. See id. 
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[had] formally decided to enter into the transaction." 105 In addition, the 
court arbitrarily concluded that the costs were "sufficiently related" to 
the transaction that produced long-term benefit. 106 Moreover, the Tax 
Court continued analyzing the issue of timing when timing had nothing 
to do with the officers' salaries. 
The Tax Court argued that the officers' salaries at bar are similar to 
Acer Realty Co. v. Commissioner, in which the salaries were determined 
to be capital expenditures. 107 However, the salaries in Acer Realty were 
"unusual, nonrecurrent services." 108 In the case at hand, the officers had 
always received salaries, and they were not increased or altered as a re-
sult of the transaction. 109 In Acer Realty, the company was in the leasing 
business, and the officers had not received salaries prior to the particular 
building transaction for which they were paid.1 10 The salaries were di-
rectly related to the transaction for services typically performed by a 
general contractor and not by a leasing business. 111 Thus, the court found 
that the salaries in Acer Realty were not ordinary expenditures for the 
leasing business and must be capitalized. 112 
The Tax Court concluded that INDOPCO required the capitalization 
of the officers' salaries. However, a closer analysis of INDOPCO sup-
ports the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Wells Fargo. In INDOPCO, the Su-
preme Court held that in investment banking, legal and other expenses 
incurred in a friendly takeover were not ordinary and necessary expenses 
but instead must be capitalized.113 In particular, the Court articulated four 
principles as the foundation for requiring the expenditures to be capital-
ized: (1) the clear reflection of income; (2) the principle that capitaliza-
tion is the norm; (3) the "separate and distinct" asset test; and (4) the "fu-
ture benefits" test. 114 
The Supreme Court began its analysis by explaining that the issue 
was one of clear reflection of income. Referring to sections 162, 263, and 
167 of the I.R.C., the Court explained: "Through provisions such as 
these, the Code endeavors to match expenses with the revenues of the 
taxable period to which they are properly attributable, thereby resulting 
105. /d. at 100-0 I. 
I 06. /d. at 102. 
107. See Acer Realty Co. v. Comm'r, 132 F.2d 512 (8th Cir. 1942). 
108. Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d at 887 (quotingAcer Realty, 132 F.2d at 513). 
109. See id. at 888. 
110. See Acer Realty, 132 F.2d at 514. 
Ill. See id. 
112. See id. 
113. See INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 79. 
114. See id. at 83-88; see also GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 78, at 957-59. The third princi-
ple, "separate and distinct" asset test is not applicable here because there was not separate asset. 
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in a more accurate calculation of net income for tax purposes." 115 This 
statement supports the finding in INDOPCO that the investment banker 
fees and legal fees incurred as a direct result of obtaining professional 
opinions regarding the takeover would be attributable to future tax peri-
ods. However, it is not so clear that expenses like those at issue here (of-
ficers' salaries that have always been paid and would have been paid re-
gardless of the merger) would be attributable to future tax periods. 
Indeed, it would appear that the opposite was true-that the salaries were 
attributable to the current tax period and thus would warrant current de-
duction. The officers' salaries had always been paid and were not deter-
mined or affected by the merger. Had there been no merger talks, the 
salaries still would have been paid and would have been currently de-
ductible as an ordinary expense. 
In INDOPCO, the Court required investment banking fees and legal 
expenses that were a direct result of a friendly merger to be capitalized. 
These expenses are markedly different from those in the case at hand. 
The expenses in INDOPCO were incurred as a direct consequence of the 
merger. Had the merger talks never been undertaken, these costs would 
not have been incurred. Consequently, they were directly related to the 
merger and thus clearly attributable to any future benefits that the merger 
would bring. However, this link cannot be made for the officers' salaries 
in the Wells Fargo case at hand. 
The second principle outlined in INDOPCO is that capitalization is 
the norm. The Supreme Court explained: 
The notion that deductions are exceptions to the norm of capitalization 
finds support in various aspects of the Code. Deductions are specifi-
cally enumerated and thus are subject to disallowance in favor of capi-
talization. Nondeductible capital expenditures, by contrast, are not ex-
haustively enumerated in the Code; rather than providing a 'complete 
list of nondeductible expenditures,' ... section 263 serves as a general 
means of distinguishing capital expenditures from current expenses. 116 
Although at first this may appear to be a powerful blow to the deduc-
tion-seeking taxpayer, it is important to note that the Court was not es-
tablishing a new rule but merely seeking to explain the established law. 
The Court obviously explained that the bar was high, but it did not state 
anything new. Even the Commissioner stated that INDOPCO did not 
h . . . I 111 c ange any govemmg pnnctp es. 
115. INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 83-84. 
116. !d. at 84. 
117. See Rev. Rul. 94-12. 
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Finally, the Supreme Court attempted to clarify Lincoln Savings and 
explained that "[a]lthough the mere presence of an incidental future 
benefit-some future aspect-may not warrant capitalization, a tax-
payer's realization of benefits beyond the year the expenditure is in-
curred is undeniably important in determining whether the appropriate 
tax treatment is immediate deduction or capitalization." 118 
The Tax Court interpreted this as meaning that any expenditure that 
creates a "future benefit" must be capitalized. But as the Eighth Circuit 
explained, that is simply not what INDOPCO held. 119 The Supreme 
Court did not expressly or exclusively adopt either the "separate and dis-
tinct asset" test or the "significant future benefit" test. INDOPCO merely 
pronounced a "facts-and-circumstances" standard. 120 The Tax Court 
failed to analyze the facts and circumstances and instead jumped to the 
conclusion that all the expenditures even indirectly relating to the merger 
must be capitalized because a merger would provide a significant future 
benefit. 121 The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, correctly analyzed 
the separate expenditures and, based on the facts and circumstances, de-
termined that the officers' salaries were deductible. 
2. The legislative history of Code section 195 supports the holding in 
Wells Fargo 
The Eighth Circuit's opinion is consistent with the legislative intent 
of section 195. Section 195 allows a taxpayer to amortize any "start -up 
expenditures." 122 Section 195( c )(I) defines "start -up expenditures" to 
mean any amount 
(A) paid or incurred in connection with investigating the creation or ac-
quisition of an active trade or business ... and (B) which, if paid or in-
curred in connection with the operation of an existing active trade or 
business (in the same field as the trade or business referred to in sub-
paragraph (A)), would be allowable as a deduction for the taxable year 
. h' h 'd . d 123 m w IC pa1 or mcurre . -
Consequently, when the parties are not in the same business, a por-
tion of the investigatory costs should qualify for elective amortization. 
When the parties are in the same business, the expenses should be imme-
diately deductible. However, if Norwest is correct, it would require that 
any expenses that produce a significant future benefit be capitalized. 
118. INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 87. 
119. See Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d at 889; see supra notes 59-73 and accompanying text. 
120. See Javaras & Maynes, supra note 15 §IV at A-25. 
121. See Norwest, 112 T.C. at 89. 
122. I.R.C. § 195 (1994). See generallyJavaras & Maynes, supra note 15. 
123. I.R.C. § 195(c) (1994). 
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Thus, no deduction would be allowed if the parties were in the same 
business. Similarly, no amortization would be allowed when the parties 
were not in the same business because it would not pass the second 
prong, i.e. that the expenditure would have been deductible if incurred in 
connection with an existing business. 124 
In Norwest, the Tax Court held that section 195 was not contrary to 
its conclusion. In particular, the court "held that section 195 does not re-
quire 'that every expenditure incurred in any business expansion is to be 
currently deductible. "'125 However, what the Tax Court did not consider 
was that, although section 195 does not require all business expansion 
costs to be deductible, it clearly does not require that all costs be capital-
ized. 
The legislative history to section 195 states: "In the case of an exist-
ing business, eligible start-up expenditures do not include deductible or-
dinary and necessary business expenses paid or incurred in connection 
with an expansion of the business. As under present law, these expenses 
will continue to be currently deductible." 126 If business expansion costs 
are not deductible, then the expenses described in section 195( c )(I )(A) 
could never satisfy the requirements in section 195( c )(I )(B), and no ex-
penditure incurred for expanding an existing trade or business would 
qualify as a "start-up expenditure," a proposition that is clearly contrary 
to the intent of Congress that the expenses described in section 
195( c )(I )(A) be eligible for amortization under section 195. 127 
The opinion in Norwest was inconsistent with the legislative intent in 
section 195, and the Court of Appeals correctly reversed the Tax Court. 
3. Wells Fargo is consistent with the IRS's prior positions 
The Service has stated that the decision of INDOPCO "did not 
change the fundamental legal principles for determining whether a par-
ticular expenditure may be deducted or must be capitalized." 128 However, 
the IRS seems to be arguing a new position with respect to the deducti-
bility of salaries. 
The IRS has long held the position that the portion of salaries alloc-
able to an acquisition must be capitalized. But that has only been for 
those who spend a "substantial amount of their time on mergers and ac-
124. See GINSBURG & LEVIN supra note 78, at 4-11. 
125. Norwest, 112 T.C. at 102 (quoting FMR Corp. & Subs. v. Comm'r, 110 T.C. 402, 429 
(1998)). 
126. S. REP. No. 96-1036, at 12 (1980). 
127. See GINSBURG & LEVIN supra note 78, at 4-15 to 4-16. 
128. Notice 96-7, 1996-6 I.R.B. 22. 
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quisitions." 129 In Rev. Rul. 73-580, the IRS stated that "compensation 
paid for services performed by ... employees relating to the acquisition 
of other corporations ... is not distinguishable from fees paid for similar 
services performed by outsiders."130 The expenses at issue in Rev Rul. 
73-580 were payments to employees in the company's legal department, 
accounting department, and internal audit staff who spent a substantial 
amount of their time on mergers and acquisitions--costs directly related 
to and incurred solely as a result of the merger. 
However, the Tax Court went well beyond Rev. Rul. 73-580 in re-
quiring capitalization of salaries which were only "incidentally" related 
to the acquisition. Moreover, the payments in the case at bar were to of-
ficers and were the ordinary and regular salaries that they had always re-
ceived. 
The IRS might argue that Rev. Rul. 73-580 specifically included ex-
ecutives' salaries in its holding. In Rev. Rul. 73-580, the IRS explained 
that payments to a corporation's president were required to be capital-
ized. However, these payments are distinguishable because they were not 
in the form of salaries but were essentially a payment in stock "as a 
commission for consummating the contract of a reorganization." 131 The 
stock paid to the president was entirely dependent and directly related to 
the consummation of the transaction. The president's regular salary was 
not required to be capitalized. In the Wells Fargo case, the salaries were 
not bonuses for undertaking or completing the merger, but instead were 
regular salaries that were in no way dependent upon the consummation 
of a transaction. These salaries were similar to the president's regular 
salary that was not required to be capitalized. 
Rev. Rul. 99-23 made clear that investigatory costs incurred in the 
general search for a new business are eligible for amortization under sec-
tion 195. Furthermore, it distinguished costs incurred when expanding an 
existing business and concluded that "a taxpayer incurring costs to inves-
tigate the expansion of an existing business generally could deduct those 
costs under § 162, assuming that other requirements of that section were 
met." This is consistent with the legislative history of section 195. 132 The 
position of the IRS and the Tax Court that the investigatory costs are not 
deductible is inconsistent with section 195, its legislative history, and 
Rev. Ruls. 73-580 and 99-23. 
129. Rev. Rul. 73-580, 1973-2 C. B. 86. See also GINSBURG & LEVIN supra note 78, at 4-19. 
130. Rev. Rul. 73-580, 1973-2 C.B. 86. 
131. /d. 
132. See supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text. 
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4. Public policy supports the Wells Fargo decision 
A fundamental problem with the Tax Court's ruling that "indirect" 
costs of a merger be capitalized is that, if the rationale is carried to its 
logical extreme, it would result in the capitalization of any cost that in 
any way could be indirectly allocated to a business expansion because 
the expansion itself is arbitrarily deemed to have a significant benefit. 
This could lead to a requirement that overhead costs that have always 
been ordinary and necessary expenses, and that would be incurred re-
gardless of the merger, similar to the officers' salaries, be capitalized to a 
certain extent because the costs are somehow indirectly related to the 
merger (perhaps there were meetings in the offices, or the officers used 
corporate supplies while evaluating the transaction). At some point the 
rationale becomes absurd, and capitalizing the officers' salaries in this 
case reaches that point. Nearly everything officers do provides a future 
benefit. But it would be inequitable for their ordinary salaries to be capi-
talized. 
More disturbing is the fact that if these expenses are required to be 
capitalized, not only will they not be currently deducted, but for practical 
matters they may never be deducted. The expenditures are not tied to an 
asset or something that can be depreciated. Instead, they relate to a trans-
action that has no defined useful life. Consequently, the expenses cannot 
be deducted until the business is disposed of or sold. In essence, the Tax 
Court's holding simply evaporated an ordinary and necessary expense. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Eighth Circuit correctly concluded that the investigatory/legal 
fees and the officers' salaries were currently deductible. The investiga-
tory and legal fees at issue were incurred prior to the "final decision" and 
thus were properly deducted. The officers' salaries were ordinary ex-
penses only indirectly related to the transaction. After an analysis of the 
case law, the legislative history of section 195, the IRS's positions, and 
public policy, it is reasonable to conclude that the Eighth Circuit properly 
allowed the salaries to be currently deducted. 
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